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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [MASS](#) [MARR](#) [EG](#)  
SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR THE TRANSFER OF 2000  
TOW-2A MISSILES TO EGYPT

REF: EGYPTIAN ARMAMENT AUTHORITY LETTER OF REQUEST  
08/OV/022 11 FEB 08.

Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reason 1.4 (b).

11. (C) Description: The Government of Egypt has requested procurement of 2,000 TOW-2A missiles.

12. (C) Reason the purchaser desires the articles or services:

a. Egypt has an immediate need to replenish its TOW missile inventory. The shelf-life of all of Egypt's 17,346 Basic TOW, ITOW, and TOW-2A missiles expires between 2006 and 2009. Because of this, the GOE has planned and budgeted for replenishment of its entire TOW missile inventory. This is the second request for TOW-2A missiles. An earlier request for 2000 missiles was approved by Congress in the summer of 12007.

b. The Office of Military-Cooperation anticipates additional requests for missiles over the coming years until all 17,346 missiles are replaced. It has strong indications that Egypt will purchase an additional 4,900 over the next two years. In light of this, we recommend that DSCA notify Congress of Egypt's intent to purchase 6,900 TOW-2A missiles over the next 2-3 years. Notification of this higher quantity will allow Egypt to expedite its future requests and allow it to coordinate its future purchases with other countries. This notification strategy will allow it to procure future missiles at lower costs.

13. (S) How the articles or services would contribute to both the U.S. and the recipient's defense/security goals:

a. (U) Egyptian Security Goals: The requested TOW missiles will give Egypt a credible anti-tank capability. The TOW is primarily a defensive weapon as it cannot be fired on the move. It must be fired from a stationary platform.

b. (S)U.S. Security Goals:

(S) (1) This procurement will strengthen the US-Egyptian mil-to-mil relationship at a time when we rely heavily on Egyptian cooperation for Suez Canal transits and over-flight rights that are critical to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. It will also demonstrate USG commitment to remain as Egypt's primary military partner and discourage it from pursuing stronger military ties with Russia or China.  
(S) (2) This procurement is consistent with DOD's Security Cooperation Guidance as it enhances the territorial security of one of our regional allies. It also supports three of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation objectives for Egypt: (a)

strengthening regional stability, (b) enabling allies and partners, and (c) protecting US and partner interests. It also supports two of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation Desired Effects (SCDE) for Egypt:

-- SCDE 3.2. "Support the defense modernization and transformation of allies or partners to reduce their vulnerability to external aggression and coercion".

-- SCDE 4.2 "Help reform the defense establishment of selected countries...improve their capacity to operate independently or in coalition with US forces...improve a country's ability to manage its defense resources".

¶4. (C) Justification for the type and quantity of articles or services requested: The Egyptian Army has possessed TOW missiles since 1981 and currently possesses an inventory of over 17,000 missiles. In light of this, this transfer does not introduce a new weapons capability to Egypt or to the region.

¶5. (C) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction of a new war fighting capability to the nation or region: Combatant Commander's assessment to follow separately, if required.

¶6. (C) Anticipated reactions of neighboring nations: The sale of these 2,000 missiles (and future sales of up to 6,900 missiles) will not affect the regional balance of power; nor will it cause negative reactions from any of Egypt's neighbors. We do not assess this transfer to have any negative impact on Israel's qualitative military edge.

¶7. (C) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles:

Egypt has demonstrated the intent and ability to protect sensitive, classified military technology over an extended period, including over 20 years of experience with the M1A1 tank program. Egypt signed a general security of information agreement with the U.S. and, as a customer, has protected the sensitive technology of other U.S. weapons systems.

¶8. (C) Training required either in-country or in the United States and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. trainers in country: No training requirement expected. However, Egypt will retain 1 dedicated in-country TOW program manager that has worked this program since its conception in the early 1980s.

¶9. (C) Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might be required as a result of providing the article: No negative impact is anticipated.

¶10. (C) Source of financing and the economic impact of the proposed acquisition: This transfer will be financed through Egypt's Foreign Military Financing-Grant (FMF-G) and will not any impact on Egypt's economy.

¶11. (C) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition: The Egyptian military has no history of human rights abuses and is under civilian control. There are no human rights considerations that would preclude the release of ammunition to the Egyptian military.

¶12. (C) Plan for end-use monitoring and plan for compliance verification: OMC Egypt has a robust Golden Sentry Program. The Golden Sentry point of contact, working in close cooperation with the security assistance program officer, will review and maintain a copy of the purchaser's physical security and accountability control plan, and stands ready to assist with or conduct inventories and inspections as required.

¶13. (C) The operational plan for use and specific end-users to include: Egypt will arm its infantry units with these TOW missiles to provide them with an anti-tank capability. This capability is essential to these units battlefield success.

¶14. (C) Description of the primary mission for the units to receive the munitions: The Egyptian Army defends Egyptian territory from foreign aggression and conducts combat operations to include counter-terrorism, protection of the Suez Canal, peace-keeping, infrastructure and force protection.

¶15. (C) Extent of anti-terrorist missions for the units to receive the munitions: These missiles contribute little in the way of anti-terrorist or counter-terrorist capabilities.

¶16. (C) Assessment of the purchaser,s capacity to afford substantially the same degree of security and accountability protection as given by the United States and willingness to accept physical security and accountability of the munitions: Numerous security audits by the U.S. Government have repeatedly verified Egypt's capability to safeguard sensitive technology and materiel as well as classified military information.

¶17. (C) Additional information in support of the transfer request: Egypt has invested hundreds of millions of dollars into its TOW missile program since 1981 and greatly values the capabilities that the system offers it. Con-sequently, we expect continued investment in this system for years to come.

¶18. (C) Country Team Recommendation: That the US Government approve this transfer of 2,000 TOW-2A missiles to Egypt and future transfers of up to 6,900 missiles. This is a coordinated mission position.

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